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Abstract—This paper presents a new protocol for Internet
voting based on implicit data security. This protocol allows
recasting of votes, which permits a change of mind by voters
either during the time window over which polling is open or
during a shorter period over which recasting is permitted. The
security of votes depends on multiple servers such that each vote
is divided into partitions and these partitions are distributed
among the servers, all of which need to be brought together to
reconstruct the votes. Such a protocol has potential applications
in bargaining and electronic commerce.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security in Internet voting is a basic research problem due
to the opposite requirements of confidentiality and verifiability.
Several cryptographic solutions have been proposed to meet
these requirements, but their effectiveness is predicated on
several assumptions. In general, security of voting and its
trustworthiness depends on the honesty of numerous agents,
human and virtual, and it is therefore easy to argue that
universal verifiability and unconditional privacy cannot be
simultaneously achieved. Nevertheless, we provide an effective
solution based on implicit data security, which has several
attractive features from the point of view of implementation.
An elaborate framework for data security based on implicit
architecture is described in [21]. Online data security has
direct applications in Internet voting because each vote can
be regarded as a voter’s data that needs to be protected. One
advantage of using vote (data) partitioning scheme in Internet
voting is that one does not require an encryption/decryption
key and that the security is implicit in the partitions. None of
the partitions reveal the vote when the election is open and
only when all the partitions are brought together, after the
closing of elections, can the votes be recreated.
Although several problematic issues remain with current
approaches to electronic voting [19], Internet voting is gen-
erally expected to become widespread in the next few years
and is already in use in Switzerland, Estonia, England, and
Netherlands, and on experimental basis in the United States
[17]. It offers ease of access to senior citizens, disabled people,
people who are traveling on the election-day, citizens living
abroad but who are eligible to vote, soldiers serving abroad,
and eliminates the hassle of obtaining an absentee ballot in
advance. It also encourages larger participation by the younger
generation that has become accustomed to online banking,
online shopping, secure email transactions and secure online
storage.
However, as in other network technologies, Internet voting
is vulnerable to viruses, Trojan horses and denial of service
attacks. A number of measures can be taken to nullify the
consequence of such attacks [18], one of which is holding
the elections over a period of many days, as in the case of
Switzerland for two weeks [14], and in Estonia [15] for a few
days. More trust may be obtained [10] if all the voters actually
voted, which in practice is almost impossible to ensure.
When an election is open for a long period, an undecided
voter may wish to change the vote as the election debate
progresses during this period. If not allowed to do so (i.e.
change the vote), the voter may tend to wait until the last
minute to cast his vote and to arrive at a final decision.
Avoiding “last minute voting” over the Internet is desirable so
as to decrease the chances of network attacks and disruptions
aimed at the final “rush hour.”
Also, voters can accidentally vote for the wrong candidate
(similar to errors in choosing wrong options in online bookings
and purchases), instances of which were noticed in the Cali-
fornia recall elections [2], [13]. Therefore, a voter may wish
to correct his mistake by casting another ballot overwriting
the previous one. As a result, it is essential that electronic
voting include a provision to recast votes. None of the present
schemes allows voters to do so.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
A number of electronic voting schemes are described in
the literature [1], [3]–[6], [11], [12], [19]. An overview of the
problems of Internet voting and implementation strategies may
be found in [8]. Convertible blind signatures [16] have been
applied on the ballots in [1] to achieve ballot secrecy, and the
intermediate results (fairness property) protected using secretly
generated random numbers. However, it is not clear how the
voter provides the authorities with this secret information after
the election is closed. In practice the voter cannot be expected
to go back to the election website in order to provide the
decryption key. Complicated Mix-Nets are used to provide
anonymization in [3]–[5], [11], which we believe can be
avoided using anonymous IDs that are untraceable to the
voter’s real identity.
Juels et al [6] propose a practical framework for developing
Internet voting schemes, but they assume an untappable chan-
nel during the registration phase which is not truly available
in practice. Postal mail is suggested as an untappable channel,
which is not true considering the number of identity thefts that
occur due to its insecurity [7]. Moreover, this scheme is not
suitable for large scale elections due to its large overhead.
The voting scheme presented in [12] and [8] replaces e-cash
with vote. It does not allow the voter to recast a ballot and aims
at revealing voter’s true identities in case of attempt at recast.
To the authors’ knowledge there does not exist any scheme
that allows a ballot recast and presently all the intermediate
election results are protected using encryption. The article
aims at presenting a scheme that overcomes this limitation and
does not require any explicit encryption of votes. In general
an electronic voting scheme needs to satisfy the following
properties [1], [3], [5], [6]:
1) Receipt freeness: The voter must not possess any proof
of the cast ballot that can be used to convince a third
party of the way in which the voter has voted.
2) Privacy: No one should be able to determine how the
voter has voted.
3) Un-reusability: A voter can cast only a single vote.
4) Un-forge-ability: An ineligible voter cannot cast a ballot.
5) Fairness: Intermediate elections results must not be
available as they provide incentive for fraud.
6) Distributed security: The security of the election process
must rely upon and must be overseen by more than
one authority. This has been traditionally achieved by
numerous poll workers and helper agencies (NGOs),
under the assumption that not all of them have been
compromised at any given stage.
The security of the system largely depends on the effectiveness
of the distributed systems and multiple audit trails.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTION
Our contribution in this article is twofold. Firstly, we present
a scheme that allows voters to recast ballots in case they wish
to change their decision or have accidently voted for a wrong
candidate. The proposed scheme achieves this by generating
an anonymous ID at the time of registration and retrieving a
set of authentic-signed ballots that can be reused. Each vote
is tracked by the anonymous ID and only the latest cast ballot
is taken into consideration. The scheme is implemented so
that when a recast in intended, the voter need not contact
the registration authority. A variation in which the voter may
wish to contact (under certain circumstances) the registration
authority while changing vote may also be implemented.
Secondly, we protect the intermediate results of election by
using implicit data security. We assume that a voter has k
servers at his disposal and he votes by creating k partitions
of his ballot and sending them to the servers along with his
anonymous ID. The implementation of this partitioning could
be done in one of the two ways: (1) by an application residing
on the voter’s computer which sets up a secure connection
with the servers that will record the partitions, and (2) At
a primary server that, in turn, sends the partitions to other
servers. In most cases, the second approach may be more
trustworthy. All of these partitions need to be brought together
to recreate the final vote during the counting phase. Security
of the system is such that as long as one of the servers is
honest any attempt to change a vote by manipulating k − 1
partitions succeeds with a probability of 1/p, where p is a
large prime. For example, if p ≈ 2100, then the probability
of changing a vote as desired, without detection, is 1/2100.
Further, the probability of changing a vote into another valid
vote, not necessarily the desired vote, can be achieved with
a probability of m/p, where m is the number of candidates
contesting in the election.
IV. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The following notations are used in the description of the
protocol.
Vid: the eligible voter’s true identification. This may include a
national ID number (Social Security Number in the US) and
certain personal information similar to that provided by voters
to a credit score reporting company over the Internet.
rid: a random identification number that the voter generates
and uses at the time of casting his ballot. This, when signed
by the registration authority acts as voter’s anonymous ID.
Cj : the jth candidate belonging to a set C, and the cardinality
|C| = m.
gx: the public key that the registration authority (RA) an-
nounces, where x is the corresponding private key. Computa-
tions are performed modulo a prime p where g is a primitive
root and public knowledge. Therefore, mx is the signature on
a message m, where 1 < m < (p− 1).
ballotj : the ballot for the jth candidate. It is a randomly
chosen number from the field Zp and is publicly known.
Hence, if a voter wishes to vote for a candidate he needs
to submit this random number as the cast ballot.
serverj : is the jth server from the set of servers S and
|S| = k.
A. Registration Phase
1) Voter generates a random identification number rid,
chosen uniformly from a set of 100 digit numbers.
2) Voter generates a blinding factor b independently and
uniformly and sends to the registration authority (RA):
rid · g
b mod p, Vid.
3) The registration authority determines if the voter is
eligible to vote and determines to what precinct the
voter belongs. Then the registration authority signs the
voters blinded rid and sends him a set of signed ballots
that he/she can use for voting. The registration authority
replies with the following message: (rid · gb)x mod p,
(ballot1)
x, (ballot2)
x, ..., (ballotm)
x mod p
4) The voter now un-blinds his anonymous rid as follows:
a) Using RA’s public key compute (gx)b mod p and
then compute its multiplicative inverse.
b) Multiply (rid · gb)x mod p with the multiplica-
tive inverse computed in step a. and retrieve
(rid)
x mod p.
5) Voter now issues a zero-knowledge challenge/response
protocol to verify RA’s signatures on rid and the set of
ballots he has received. If the signature is found invalid
then the voter can launch a disavowal protocol. The
proper formation of the ballots can be checked by the
voter if he wishes.
The voter at the end of registration phase has a valid signed
rid and a set of signed ballots that can be used to vote. The
voter may proceed to cast his ballot as follows.
B. Voting Phase
1) Voter contacts his assigned online polling booth using
a secure shell (SSL) connection over the Internet and
sends: (rid)x mod p, rid.
2) The polling booth verifies the validity of rid using either
of the following approaches:
a) Each online polling booth may have a copy of x,
in which case checking for the signature is trivial.
b) Alternatively, the online polling booth may conduct
a zero-knowledge challenge/response protocol with
the RA to validate the signature.
In case a collision is detected, the voter may need to
contact the RA again and obtain another singed rid.
3) If the signature is found valid the online polling booth
stores the voter’s rid and provides the voter with a
secure session key that he can use to cast his ballot by
contacting the k voting servers.
4) The voter chooses the ballot corresponding to the can-
didate that he wishes to vote for and divides the ballot
into k partitions and sends one partition to each of the
k servers. In order to partition the ballot, the voter uses
the following procedure:
a) The voter generates an equation of degree k such
that its coefficients belong to Zp. For example,
xk + ak−1x
k−1 + ... + a1 + ballot ≡ 0 mod p,
where ai, ballot ∈ Zp.
b) He then computes the k roots of the equation
such that, (x− r1)(x− r2)...(x− rk) ≡ 0 mod p.
It is to noted that roots may not exist for any
arbitrary equation and the coefficients may need to
be adjusted. Also, r1 · r2 · ... · rk ≡ ballot mod p.
c) The voter now stores these roots on different
servers as partitions.
C. Counting Phase
1) All the servers pool together the partitions of the vote
and recreate the secret by multiplying them in the finite
field Zp.
2) The signature is verified on the ballots and if found valid
the ballot is included into the final tally.
Fig. 1. Illustration of proposed voting protocol
D. Re-voting
If a voter wishes to change his vote, he may do so by
contacting the online polling booth using his rid to authenti-
cate himself and simply choose another ballot from the set of
signed ballots and divide it into partitions and distribute them
to other servers. The servers will overwrite his previously cast
ballot partitions if any.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
Theorem 1: We assert the following regarding the proposed
protocol:
1) Even if k − 1 servers collude, they do not gain any
information about the cast ballot.
2) If k− 1 colluding servers wish to change the cast ballot
into another desired ballot, then this can be achieved
only with a probability of 1/p.
3) The probability of k− 1 colluding servers changing the
cast ballot to another valid ballot is m/p.
Proof: The proof of the assertions is presented below.
1) One of the ways to create the partitions would be that
the voter chooses k − 1 roots at random and computes
the kth root using rk = r1 · ... · rk−1 · ballot mod p.
Since, the colluding servers do not know that cast
ballot, knowledge of all but one root leaves the last root
undetermined and vice versa. Without knowing the last
root, the cast ballot remains undetermined.
2) All the operations are performed in the field Zp such
that each candidate’s ballot is a randomly chosen number
(known to public) from the field. Further a signed ballot
is again an integer within the field. Therefore there exist
m integers in the field that are valid singed ballots.
From the part 1 of the proof, we notice that even the
knowledge of k − 1 roots does not reveal the ballot.
Consequently, if the colluding servers wish to change the
cast ballot into their desired ballot by only manipulating
k − 1 (or less) partitions then the best attempt they can
make is by fixing k−2 partitions and changing the value
of (k−1)st partition so that the final result is the desired
ballot. However, since they do not know the value of the
kth partition (which is also fixed) and neither do they
know the value of the already cast ballot, the colluding
servers can achieve their goal only with a probability of
1/p.
3) It follows from part 2 of the proof, that since there are
m valid ballots, manipulating k − 1 (or less) partitions
will result in a valid singed ballot with a probability of
m/p.
Theorem 2: The knowledge of k−1 partitions is equivalent
to the knowledge of k−i partitions, 1 ≤ i ≤ k−2, i.e. a server
does not gain any information about the ballot by colluding
with other servers as long as one at least of the servers does
not collude and manipulation of k − 1 ballots is equivalent
to manipulation of k − i partitions. In essence, no advantage
is gained by collusion (if at least one of the servers remains
honest).
Proof: Assume that the partitions are created as described
in part 1 of Theorem 1 and that the servers do not know
the value of the original cast ballot (which is practically the
case). Therefore if k − 1 partitions are fixed to a constant,
the entire field Zp can be ‘swept’ by changing the value
of only the kth partition. Therefore, knowledge of one or
more partitions as long as the kth partition is kept secret
does not help in manipulating the reconstruction of the ballot
and servers do not gain any advantage by collusion. Further,
any of the colluding servers can sweep the entire field by
changing only its partition and does not need the other servers
to change any of their partitions. Hence, collusion is of no use
and the probabilities of creating a valid/desired output remains
unchanged by collusion.
Other properties of the protocol are analyzed below:
1) Receipt freeness: The proposed protocol is receipt free
and it is assumed that at least one of the servers will
be honest (an assumption that is present in the mix-net
schemes as well) providing assurance to the voter that
his vote will be counted as cast and any discrepancy will
be detected with a very high probability.
2) Un-forge-ability: An ineligible voter cannot cast a vote
because two parts constitute a vote, the signed ballot
and the certified rid. For an ineligible voter to cast a
ballot, he must generate a random ID and forge the
signature of the registration authority, i.e. solve for x,
given gx mod p, g and p. This is equivalent to solving
the discrete log problem and computationally infeasible.
Leakage of information about the signature exponent
is avoided by using a zero-knowledge challenge and
response protocol for signature verification. Note that
even if an eligible voter provides an ineligible voter with
a copy of signed ballots, the ineligible voter will still
need a valid signed anonymous ID to cast a vote, which
cannot be generated without registering.
3) Un-reusability: Since every eligible voter is issued only
one rid, he cannot use it to cast multiple votes using it
because if he does so the servers will simply overwrite
the previous cast ballot for that ID. Furthermore, forging
a new rid is ruled out by property 2 above.
4) Fairness: The ballot cast is divided into partitions during
the voting phase and unless all the partitions are known,
all the ballots remain equally likely. This is established
by the above theorems.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new protocol for Internet voting in
which the security of the cast ballots depends on numerous
servers and the fairness property is satisfied by the use of a
ballot partitioning scheme. No encryption/decryption key is
used and there is no explicit encryption of the votes. The
partitions of the ballot provide implicit security. Variations
of this protocol may be used in a variety of applications in
bargaining and electronic commerce.
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